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Portrait of Thomas Raeburn White
Graces the School

The portrait of renowned
civic leader and member of the
Law School Class of 1899, Thomas
Raeburn White, painted by Franklin Watkins was presented to the
Law School by Mrs. White in the
spring of 1979. The painting hangs
in Room 101 joining other Watkins
renditions of Justice Owen J.
Roberts and Dean Jefferson B.
Fordham .
Mr. White, in addition to
actively crusading for better government for the city of Philadelphia, was a recognized authority
on the Constitution of Pennsylvania and, for a short period, was
Assistant Professor of Law here at
the School.
Established through the generosity of Mrs. White in memory
of her husband, there is a Thomas
Raeburn White Urban Affairs Research Fund at Penn Law School
which appropriately provides
funds for field studies during the
summer interval dealing with research in the area of urban affairs.

At the Thomas Watkins painting of the late Thomas Raeburn White, 1899, (from left to right)
Assistant Dean Christopher F. Mooney, Mrs. Clarence Morris, Mr. Bernard Lentz, '36, Mr.
Thomas Raeburn White, Jr., '36, Mrs. Thomas Raeburn White, Dean James 0. Freedman ,
Professor Clarence Morris.
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Frederick Douglas Moot Court winners
(from left to right) Dalton Phillips, '80 and
Greg Berry, '80 with Faculty Advisor,
Professor Ralph R. Smith .

The Roberts Lecture-A Reminder
Sydney W. Kentridge, counsel
to the Stephen Biko Family at the
inquest in South Africa last year,
will be the 1979 Owen J. Roberts
Memorial Lecturer on Thursday,
October 18 at the University of
Pennsylvania Museum auditorium.
The provocative title of Mr.
Kentridge's Lecture is "The Pathology of a Legal System : Criminal
Justice in South America."
Traditionally, the Lecture will
be followed by a dinner/reception
at the Museum.
Wanted: One Alumni Trustee
The Nominating Committee
of the General Alumni Society is
inviting Alumni to suggest names
to be considered for an alumni
trustee position which will become vacant on June 30, 1980.
The committee will select candidates to run in an election to fill a
vacancy that will occur with the
expiration of the five-year term of
John Bixler of Washington, D .C.,
Alumni Trustee for the Middle
Atlantic Region.
In addition to serving as
trustee of the University of Pennsylvania, alumni trustees have
special responsibilities to serve as
liaison between the Alumni and
the University. They also hold
seats on the Board of Directors of
the General Alumni Society.
Suggested names and requests
for further information can be sent
to Michel T. Huber, Executive Secretary, General Alumni Society,
University of Pennsylvania, Eisenlohr Hall, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104. The deadline for
suggesting names is November 15,
1979.
The Middle Atlantic Region is
composed of Maryland, Virginia,

West Virginia, Delaware and the
District of Columbia and the areas
of Southern and Central New
Jersey.
Keedy Cup 1979
This year's Edwin J. Keedy
Cup Competition will be held on
Monday, November 12 at the University of Pennsylvania Museum.
The panel of judges will be
Justice Lewis F. Powell of the
United States Supreme Court,
Judge Phyllis Kravitch,'43, of the
United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit, and Judge RichardS. Arnold of the United States
District Court for the Eastern and
Western Districts of Arkansas.
Michelle Holland, Ellen Surloff, Flora Wolf and Carol Yorkfour women from the Class of
1980-are the competing finalists .

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

Moot Court Winners
Compete Nationally
Greg Berry and Dalton Phillips, both members of the Law
School Class of 1980, ranked third
in the final rounds of the Frederic
Douglas Moot Court Competition
held in San Francisco this past
March .
Professor Ralph Smith was
Faculty advisor to Phillips and
Berry who, as winners of the
Eastern District Moot Court Cham pionship, qualified as representatives of Penn Law School in the
national competition .
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The Law Alumni Society

THE LAW ALUMNI SOCIETY-1979-1980
Many Alumni are unaware that graduation
from the University of Pennsylvania Law School
automatically qualifies them as members of the Law
Alumni Society.
The Society's general purposes are manifold.
They include the advancement of the interests of
the Law School, the Society and its members; and
the promotion and perpetuation of the spirit of
good feeling and commonality of interests among
graduates. These objectives are achieved through
the planning of meetings and social events which
enable interchange and communication among and
between Alumni, Faculty and Administration; by
providing Alumni with information concerning the

School through appropriate publications; by encouraging Alumni support through Annual Giving;
by aiding students with job placement before and
after graduation; and by sponsoring lectures and
panel discussions on matters of current legal
interest.
Five Officers and fifteen Managers are elected
by the Alumni and meet regularly to plan and oversee Alumni activities. The Board of Managers also
includes seven ex-officio members, twelve past
Presidents of the Alumni Society, and the representatives from each of the thirteen regional Law
Alumni Clubs.

Law Alumni Society

Officers

PresidentMarsha// A. Bernstein, '49
Bernstein, Bernstein and Harrison
1521 Locust Street, 7th Floor
Philadelphia, PA

First Vice-Presidentjoseph G.]. Connolly, '65
Goodman and Ewing
1700
Market Street
19102
Philadelphia, PA

SecretaryLinda A. Fisher, '73
Dechert, Price and Rhoads
3400 Centre Square West
1500 Market Street
Philadelphia, PA

TreasurerPaxson,
Richard
L. Kalish,
Bazelon , '68
Dilworth,
Levy and Kauffman
2600 The Fidelity Building 19109
Philadelphia, PA

19102

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/plj/vol15/iss1/1
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Second Vice-PresidentHan. Doris May Harris, '49
Court of Common Pleas
19107
258 City Hall
Philadelphia, PA
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Board of Managers

Robert M. Beckman, '56
Beckman and Smith
1001 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Suite 235
Washington, D.C. 20036
George T. Brubaker, '67
Hartman, Underhill & Brubaker
23 East King Street
Lancaster, PA 17602
Bernard M. Gross, '59
Gross and Sklar, PC
1630 Locust Street
Philadelphia, PA 19103

Paul j. Bschorr, '65
White and Case
14 Wall Street
New York, NY 10005

Mitchell Brock, '53
Sullivan and Cromwell
125 Broad Street
New York, NY 10004

Charles I. Cogut, '73
Simpson, Thacher and Bartlett
One Battery Park Plaza
New York, NY 10004

Lester Kabacoff, '37
1404 International Trade Mart
New Orleans, LA 70130

Howard Gittis, '58
Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen
Packard Building, 12th Floor
Philadelphia, PA 19102

james A. Strazzella, '64
Temple University Law School
1719 North Broad Street
Philadelphia, PA 19122

Marlene F. Lachman, '70
Mesirov, Gelman, Jaffe, Cramer and
jamison
The Fidelity Building
Philadelphia, PA 19109

Sharon Kaplan Wallis, '67
Wallis and Flick
640-42 Rodman Street
Philadelphia, PA 19147

Morris M. Shuster, '54
Shuster and Beckman
700 Widener Building
Philadelphia, PA 19107

Sherrie Raiken Savett, '73
David Berger, P.A.
1622 Locust Street
Philadelphia, PA 19103
john A. Terrill, '76
Duane, Morris and Heckscher
1600 Land Title Building
100 S. Broad Street
Philadelphia, PA 19110
William White, '38
Duane, Morris and Heckscher
1600 Land Title Building
100 South Broad Street
Philadelphia, PA 19110

Ex-Officio Members

Chair of Annual Giving Organization
Richard M. Dicke, '40
Simpson, Thacher and Bartlett
One Battery Plaza
New York, New York 10004
Representative to the Alumnae Association
Stephanie W. Naidoff, '66
U.S. Department of Health, Education
and Welfare
3535 Market Street
Philadelphia, PA 19101
Representative to the General Alumni Society
Leonard Barkan, '53
Distribution International
260 New York Drive
Ft. Washington, PA 19034

Representative to the Board of Directors
of the Organized Classes
William F. Lynch II, '49
Morris, james, Hitchens and Williams
12th and Market Streets
P.O. Box 2306
Wilmington, DE 19899
President of the Order of the Coif
Robert L. Kendall, '55
Schnader, Harrison, Segal and Lewis
1719 Packard Building
Philadelphia, PA 19102

Co-Chairs, Law Alumni Council
Harold Cramer, '51
Mesirov, Gelman, Jaffe, Cramer
and jamison
The Fidelity Building
Representative to the Publications Board of the
Philadelphia, PA 19109
General Alumni Society
Patricia Ann Metzer, '66
Howard L. Shecter, '68
Coulston and Storrs
Morgan, Lewis and Bockius
One Federal Street
2100 The Fidelity Building
Boston, Massachusetts 02110
Philadelphia, PA 19109
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Dean
james 0. Freedman
University of Pennsylvania
The Law School
3400 Chestnut Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
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Past Presidents
Law Alumni Society

Leon J. Obermayer, '08
Obermayer, Rebmann, Maxwell
& Hippe!
1418 Packard Building
Philadelphia, PA 19102
Robert L. Trescher, '37
Montgomery, McCracken, Walker
& Rhoads
20th Floor
Three Parkway
Philadelphia, PA 19102

Henry T. Reath, '48
Duane, Morris & Heckscher
1600 Land Title Building
Philadelphia, PA 19110

Edwin P. Rome, '40
Rome, Klaus, Comisky & McCauley
1100 Four Penn Center Plaza
Philadelphia, PA

Carroll R. Wetzel, '30
Dechert, Price & Rhoads
3400 Centre Square West
Philadelphia, PA 19102

Thomas N. O'Neill, '53
Montgomery, McCracken, Walker
& Rhoads
20th Floor
3 Parkway
Philadelphia, PA 19102

Harold Cramer, '51
Mesirov, Gelman, Jaffe, Cramer
and Jamison
Fidelity Building
Philadelphia, PA 19109

Philip W. Amram, '27
Amram & Hahn
11th Floor,
1150 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

William F. Hyland, '49
Riker, Danzio, Scherer, Debevoise
& Hyland
744 Broad Street
Newark, NJ 07102

Thomas Raeburn White, Jr., '36
White & Williams
17th Floor
1234 Market Street
Philadelphia, PA 19107

19103

David H. Marion, '63
Kohn, Savett, Marion & Graf, P.C.
1214 IVB Building
Philadelphia, PA 19103

Joseph P. Flanagan, Jr., '52
Ballard, Spahr, Andrews & Ingersoll
30 South 17th Street
Philadelphia, PA 19103

Regional Law Clubs
Wilkes-Barre/Scranton

John L. McDonald, '40
(717) 823-5181
Silverblatt and Townend
14th Floor, United Penn Bank Building
Wilkes-Barre, PA 18701
Hon. Ernest D. Preate, Jr., '65
District Attorney
Lackawanna County Courthouse
Scranton, PA 18503

(717) 961-6717

Joseph J. Savitz, '51
Rosenn, Jenkins and Greenwald
15 South Franklin Street
Wilkes-Barre, PA 18711

(717) 826-5600

Southwestern Pennsylvania

Robert J. Dodds, Jr., '40
Reed, Smith, Shaw and McClay
P.O. Box 2009
Pittsburgh, PA 15230

(412) 288-3131

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/plj/vol15/iss1/1

George J. Miller, '51
Colonial Building
2nd and Ross Streets
Pittsburgh, PA 15230

(412) 281-8209

B. Patrick Costello, '52
Costello and Berk
15 North Main Street
Greensburg, PA 15601

(412) 834-2100

Harrisburg

Francis B. Haas, '51
McNees, Wallace and Nurick
100 Pine Street
P.O. Box 1166
Harrisburg, PA 17108

(717) 236-9341

John W. Carroll, '72
(717) 787-1956
Department of Environmental Resources
Bureau of Administrative Enforcement
503 Executive House
Harrisburg, PA 17120
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James D. Morris, '75
(717) 787-7060
Department of Environmental Resources
Bureau of Administrative Enforcement
503 Executive House
Harrisburg, PA 17120
Delaware
H. Albert Young, '29
(302) 571-6600
Young, Conaway, Stargott and Taylor
1401 Market Tower, P.O. Box 607
Wilmington, DE 19899

John P. Sinclair, '39
Potter, Anderson and Corroon
350 Delaware Trust Building
P.O. Box 951
Wilmington, DE 19899

(302) 658-6771

Thomas Reed Hunt, Jr., '72
Morris, Nichols, Arsht and Tunnell
12th and Market Streets
P.O. Box 1347
Wilmington, DE 19899
Washington, D.C.
Thomas B. Wilner, '69 (President)
Arnold and Porter
1220 -19th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

P.O. Box 3239
Tampa, Florida 33601
Joseph J. Weisenfeld, '67
Pettigrew and Bailey
1820 One Biscayne Tower
Miami, Florida 33131
Atlanta
Gail Massee, '74
Hansell, Post, Brandon and Dorsey
3300 -1st National Bank Tower
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Ralph B. Levy, '70
King and Spalding
2500 Trust Co. Tower
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

William F. Lynch II, '49
(302) 571-6700
Morris, James, Hitchens and Williams
12th and Market Streets
P.O. Box 2306
Wilmington, DE 19899
(302) 658-9200
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Chicago
William B. Johnson, '43
I.C. Industries
111 E. Wacker Drive
Chicago, IL 60601

(305) 374-5600

(404) 581-8000

(404) 572-4600

(312) 565-3001

Richard J. Farrell, '41
(312) 372-5600
Rooks, Pitts, Fullagar and Poust
208 South La Salle Street, Suite 1776
Chicago, IL 60604

(202) 872-6700

A. Raymond Randolph, Jr., '69 (Vice-President)
Sharp, Randolph and Green
(202) 659-2400
Suite 501
1800 Massachusetts Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20036
Mary W. Ennis, '78 (Secretary/Treasurer)
Steptoe and Johnson
(202) 862-2000
1250 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
Florida
Edward I. Cutler, '37
(813) 223-5366
Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emmanuel, Smith and
Cutler, P.A.
20th Floor, Exchange National Bank Building
610 Florida Avenue

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

Richard F. Kotz, '65
(312) 564-8600
International Mineral Chemical Corporation
2315 Sanders Road
Northbrook, I L 60062
New England
Patricia Ann Metzer, '66
Goulston and Storrs
One Federal Street
Boston, Massachusetts 02110

Robert G. Fuller, Jr., '64
Doyle and Fuller
One Community Drive
Augusta, Maine 04330

(617) 482-1776

(207) 622-6126

Northern New Jersey
William F. Hyland, '49
(201) 622-7700
Riker, Danzig, Scherer, Debevoise and Hyland
National Newark Building, 744 Broad Street
Newark, NJ 07102
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Jerry R. Dempsey, '66
Dempsey, Dempsey and Sheehan
387 Springfield Avenue
Summit, NJ 07901

(201) 277-0388

David M . Satz, Jr., '66
(201) 622-3331
Saiber, Schlesinger, Satz and Goldstein
Suite 2440,11 Commerce Street
Newark, NJ 07102
Southern New Jersey
Hon. L. Anthony Gibson, '64, JSC
(609) 345-6700, ext. 375
Atlantic County Civil Court Building
1201 Bacharach Boulevard
Atlantic City, NJ 08401

Lawrence M. Perskie, '49
(609) 344-3161
Cooper, Perskie, Katzman, April, Niedelman
and Wagenheim
320 Guarantee Bank Building
Atlantic City, NJ 08401
Hon . Steven P. Perskie, '69
New Jersey State Senate
State House
Trenton, NJ 08625
New York
Paul J. Bshorr, '65 (President)
White and Case
14 Wall Street
New York, NY 10005

(609) 292-5217

(212) 732-1040

Harvey G. Wolfe, '57 (1st Vice-President)
Wolfe and Wolfe
(212) 757-6392
1540 Broadway
New York, NY

Sandor X. Mayuga, '74 (Secretary/Treasurer)
(213) 435-5631
Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown and Baerwitz
120 Linden Avenue
Long Beach, CA 90801
Northern California
Gerald V. Niesar, '69
Niesar, Moody, Hill and Massey
One Market Plaza, Suite 2501
San Francisco, CA 94105

(415) 777-1112

Murray J. Waldman, '52
Waldman and Kline
2700 Russ Building
235 Montgomery Street
San Francisco, CA 94104

(415) 981-1300 .

Thomas R. Owens, '69
Goldfarb and Owens
1333 Broadway
Suite 825
Oakland, CA 94612

(415) 839-6336

Baltimore
Searle E. Mitnick, '69
(301) 539-6967
Kaplan, Heyman, Greenberg, Engelman
and Belgrad, P.A.
10th Floor, Sun Life Building
Baltimore, MD 21201

John E. Kratz, Jr., '70
Paper and Marbury
1100 Charles Center South
36 S. Charles Street
Baltimore, MD 21201

(301) 539-2530

Charles I. Cogut, '73 (2nd Vice-President and Sec.)
Simpson, Thacher and Bartlett
(212) 483-9000
One Battery Park Plaza
New York, NY 10004
Nancy W. Pierce, '74 (Treasurer)
(212) 541-5800
Chadbourne, Parke, Whiteside and Wolff
30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York, NY 10020
Southern California
Douglas C. Con roy, '68 (President) (213) 489-4000
Paul, Hastings, Janofsky and Walker
22nd Floor, 555 S. Flower Street
Los Angeles, CA 90071
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Beyond Legal Reasoning
by The Honorable Edmund B. Spaeth, Jr.
Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Editor's Note: judge Spaeth, in his inimitably eloquent fashion, delivered the following message to
the University of Pennsylvania Law School, Philadelphia Chapter of The Order of the Coif in june,

1979.
The judge is a part-time lecturer here at The
Law School.

9

The Order of the Coif used to be the corporate
society of the serjeants-at-law. The serjeants came
from the four greater Inns of Court. According to a
1537 account, this occurred as follows:
The chief justice of the common bench
is accustomed, with the counsel and assent
of all the justices, to choose, as often as
seems to him opportune, seven or eight
of the persons of more mature age who
have become more proficient in the aforesaid study of the law, and who seem to the
justices of the best disposition; ... 1
These persons then appeared and took upon
themselves "the estate and degree of serjeant-atlaw."2
If we retained the English sense of ceremony,
that would mean that now there would be placed
on the head of each of you, "with the same solemnity as the helmet was placed on the head of the
knight," 3 the white coif, which was a special closefitting hood that covered all but the face.
I leave to others whether you are "persons of
more mature age." Clearly, however, you are persons "of the best disposition," "who have become
more proficient in the aforesaid study of the law."
I rather regret that I won't have the chance to pull
a white coif down over your heads. But failing that,
I am delighted at least to be able to add my warmest congratulations to the many other congratulations you will rightly receive.
In congratulating you, however, I should like
to share a concern. I impose on you in this way
because those of us who are truly of more mature
age look to you for inspiration.
Each of you has become proficient in the study
of the law because each of you is unusually good at
legal reasoning. Legal reasoning is one of our most
powerful tools. It is a delight to use, and has made
possible some of our noblest achievements. Our
Constitution, for example. And, to continue being
parochial, a handful of court decisions. Would you
start with Marbury v. Madison 4 perhaps, and end
with Brown v. Board of Education? 5 I'd include
Cardozo's opinion for the New York Court of Appeals in People v. Zackowitz. 6 Nevertheless, the
very power of legal reasoning, its self-assured way
of deducing conclusions from authoritative prem1. Quoted in Strong, Order of the Coif: English Antecedents and American Adaptation, 63 A.B.A.). 1725 (1977).

2. ld.
3. ld. at 1726.
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Beyond Legal Reasoning

ises, may bewitch us and lead us to statements and
actions we will one day find shameful.
A premise of Roman law was that a father
should have uncontrolled power over his children.
It followed that not only could he punish-and
even kill-his child; he could give a wife to his son;
he could give his daughter in marriage; he could
transfer his children to another family by adoption;
he could sell his children. 7 Until recently a premise
of our own law was that children were wards of a
fatherly juvenile court judge, from which it followed that children were without basic constitutional rights.8 Prisoners were regarded as "slaves of
the state," and so beyond the protection of the
constitution. 9 In Dred Scott, the Supreme Court of
the United States reasoned that blacks had been
denied the rights of citizenship because they were,
in the Court's words, "a subordinate and inferior
class of beings, who had been subjugated by the
dominant race .... " 1° Consider the following legal
reasoning by the Supreme Court of Virginia, in
striking down as void a provision in a will that the
testator's slaves could choose between emancipation and public sale:
[l]n the eye of the law [said the Court], so
far certainly as civil rights and relations
are concerned, the slave is not a person,
but a thing. The investiture of a chattel
with civil rights or legal capacity [to
choose] is indeed a legal solecism .... 11
The Supreme Court of California once explained
that Chinese had no right to testify against white
men in a criminal case because Chinese were "a
race of people whom nature has marked as inferior,
and who are incapable of progress or intellectual
development beyond a certain point. ... " 12 De
Bracton said that "a jew cannot have anything of
his own, because whatever he acquires he acquires
not for himself but for the king .. . ." 13 And the first
woman in Wisconsin who thought she had the right
to practice law was told she did not:
The law of nature [said the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin] destines and qualifies the
female sex for the bearing and nurture
of the children of our race and for the
custody of the homes of the world . ...
Nature has tempered woman as little for
the juridical conflicts of the court room
4. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
5. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
6. 254 N.Y. 192, 172 N.E. 466 (1930) .

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/plj/vol15/iss1/1

as for the physical conflicts of the
battle field .... 14
As I read these old cases-some of them not
so old-1 have the uncomfortable feeling that some
of my own statements of legal reasoning may some
day seem equally fallacious. How do you suppose
we can avoid such results?
Perhaps the first answer that suggests itself is
that we should turn to science.
Surely science can help. The findings of neurologists, psychiatrists, and psychologists have transformed the law of mental health; our reasoning
there no longer proceeds from the premise that a
mentally disturbed person is possessed by a demon.
In the school desegregation cases, the Supreme
Court of the United States was helped by sociological and psychological studies of the results of educating children in all-black schools.' 5 In the death
penalty cases the court was helped by statistical
analyses (much of the data for which were gathered
by University of Pennsylvania Law School students)
of who was, and who was not, condemned to
death, and where, and for what sort of crime. 16
Environmental law is probably the best example.
Not so long ago the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
refused to stop a coal company from discharging
polluted mine water into a tributary of the Lackawanna River because, said the Court, the plaintiff's
grievance was "for a mere personal inconvenience"
that had to "yield to the necessities of a great
public industry, which although in the hands of a
private corporation, subserves a great public interest."17 We don't reason that way anymore. As
Jacques Cousteau has explained, on the basis of his
studies of the oceans: "The cycle of life is intricately tied up with the cycle of water ... the water
system has to remain alive if we are to remain alive
on earth." 18 In a recent essay Dr. Lewis Thomas of
the Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center says
this:
The earth holds together, its tissues
cohere, and it has the look of a structure
that really would make comprehensible
7. H. Maine, Ancient Law 153 (Pollock ed. 1930), cited
and quoted by Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?-Toward
Legal Rights for Natural Objects. Professor Stone's paper originally appeared in a special issue of Southern California Law
Review on "Law & Technology," Volume 45, Number 2,
Spring of 1972. I have used a reprint by William Kaufman, Inc.,
1974. The citation to Maine is on page 4 of that reprint. The
ensuing collection of cases is mostly taken from Stone's paper,
at pp. 4-8 of the reprint. The reprint is hereinafter cited as
"Stone."
8. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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sense if only we knew enough about it.
From a little way off, photographed from
the moon, it seems to be a kind of
organism. Looked at over its whole time,
it is plainly in the process of developing,
like an enormous embryo ....
And now human beings have
swarmed like bees over the whole surface, changing everything, meddling with
all the other parts, making believe we
are in charge, risking the survival of the
entire magnificent creature. 19
It would be difficult to overstate the power of
this vision; I have no doubt that it will transform
our law-not only of the environment but of individual rights and international relations. Even so, I
suggest, we cannot count on science to set straight
the premises of our legal reasoning.
Now, you know I'm no scientist. What I'm
about to say is mostly from a recent enchanting
book by Gary Zukav, which tries to explain to people like me, or anyway give us some feeling for,
the new physics. 20 Zukav's basic point is that the old
physics-Newton's physics-assumed an objective
reality-something "out there"-whereas the new
physics does not assume an objective reality but
instead believes that we cannot observe something
without changing it, and that therefore there is no
reality apart from our experience. 21
For example: Suppose we want to see an electron moving around in its orbit. Since electrons are
so small, we cannot use ordinary light; the wavelength of ordinary light is much too long to "see"
an electron. If we hold a strand of hair up to the
light, the hair won't cast a shadow; it's so thin the
light waves will just bend around it. To see something, we have to obstruct the light waves we are
looking with. In other words, we have to illuminate
it with wavelengths smaller than it is. For this reason, Werner Heisenberg used gamma rays, which
have the shortest wavelength known; compared to
the tiny wavelength of gamma rays, an electron is
large enough to obstruct some of them . In this way
we can determine the position of an electron. The
problem is, a gamma ray has much more energy
than ordinary light. Therefore, when a gamma ray
9. Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796
(1871). See also Spaeth, Due Process In The Prison: A Third
Form, 22 Viii. L. Rev. 1, 9 (1976).
10. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 396, and see
404-05 (1856).
11. Bailey v. Poindexter's Ex'r, 56 Va. (14 Gratt.) 132,
142-43
(1858).Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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hits an electron, it illuminates it, but it also knocks
it out of its orbit and changes its direction and
speed-its momentum-in an unpredictable and
uncontrollable way. Thus, we can never determine
both the position and the momentum of an
electron:
Whatever it is that we are observing
can have a determinable momentum,
and it can have a determinable position,
but of these two properties, we must
choose, for any given moment, which one
we wish to bring into focus. This means,
in reference to "moving particles" anyway, that we can never see them the way
they "really are," but only the way we
choose to see them !22
Or as Heisenberg put it:
What we observe is not nature itself, but
nature exposed to our questioning. 23
Another example: In 1803 Thomas Young
proved (once and for all, he thought) that light was
wavelike in nature. He did this by an experiment
showing that when light went through two slits, it
diffracted and interfered with itself in a way that
only waves could do. 24 But in 1905 Albert Einstein,
who knew all about Young's experiment, nevertheless proved that light is composed of tiny particles;
a beam of light, said Einstein, is like a stream of
particles, or bullets, each bullet being called a
photon. 25 ln other words: The wave-like behavior of
light is not a property of light. Neither is the
particle-like behavior of light. Both behaviors are
properties of our interaction with light.
Last year Bryan Magee of All Souls College,
Oxford, interviewed Hilary Putnam on BBC television. Putnam is a philosopher of science at
Harvard . In the course of the interview Putnam
observed that it used to be that
no philosopher doubted that truth was
correspondence to reality, or "agreement" with reality. The image was of
knowledge as a mirror, or copy. 26
Referring to wave/ particle duality of light, Putnam
went on to say that
the step taken by a number of scientists
and philosophers in the twentieth century ... is the idea that there are
12. People v. Hall, 4 Col. 399, 405 (1854).
13. Quoted by Stone, supra at 7, n. 21, in turn quoting
Schechter. The Rightlessness of Mediaeval English jewry, 45
jewish Q. Rev. 121, 128 (1954).
14. In re Goddell, 39 Wise. 232, 245 (1875).
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alternative conceptual schemes, and the
further idea that the concepts we impose
(or seek to impose) upon the world may
not be the right ones and we may have
to revise them-that there is an
interaction between what we contribute
and what we discover. 27
All of which led Magee to say:
This raises the utterly fundamental question: "What is truth?" When we say that
this or that scientific statement or theory
is true, what ... can we mean? 28
What indeed?
We are not, of course, limited to science as a
resource in our effort to straighten out the premises
of legal reasoning. How about religion or philosophy? When I examine these, however, I feel as
though I were in a small boat when the wind, the
tide, and the current are all at odds.
Religion depends, I think, on faith. Its fundamental characteristic is acceptance of certain propositions without proof-for example, that the world
was created by God, who made man in His own
image. The fundamental characteristic of science,
however, is rejection without proof. We must test
our ideas, according to Francis Bacon. "And remember, you may have to change them." Science
does not recognize any proposition as final. Hilary
Putnam puts it this way:
We have replaced [Newton's] picture of
an absolute space and an absolute time
with [Einstein's] picture of a fourdimensional space-time. We have
replaced the picture of a Euclidean world
with the picture of a world which obeys
a geometry we never dreamed of ....
. ... the main theories of the
twentieth century-relativity and quantum
mechanics-will give way to some other
theory which will supersede both of
them. And so on, forever. 29
15. Brown v. Board of Education, supra at 494 n. 11 .
16. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 250 n. 15 (1972)
(DOUGLAS, J. concurring); ld. at 291-3, nn . 40-47 (BRENNAN,
J. concurring) .
17. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113 Pa. 126, 149,
6 A. 453, 459 (1886).
18. Cousteau, The Oceans: No Time to Lose, L.A. Times,
Oct. 24, 1971, § (Opinion), at 1, col. 4, quoted by Stone, supra
at 45.
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But if science may be at odds with religion,
philosophy may be at odds with science. Consider,
for example, the existentialists' critique of science. 30
At least with Bacon and Descartes, science distinguished between the mind and the external world.
There are people (and perhaps God, too) observing
the world, and there is the world they are observing. This dualism implies that the purpose of the
mind is to categorize, schematize, measure and,
ultimately, manipulate nature. In Bacon's fierce
phrase, "We must put nature to the rack, to compel
it to answer our questions." Existentialism rebels
against this dualism. It doesn't feel right to set the
mind and the world off against each other; I don't
see you as a mind attached to a body. Instead of
asking what it is to know, the existentialists ask
what it is to be, to exist. And asking this, they have
come to some striking conclusions. Existence is
seen as inescapably contingent. Our life starts as a
sort of throw of the dice; we don't pick our parents, or when or where we are born. Existence becomes a task imposed on us, and this idea leads to
the existentialist ideas of anxiety, which we experience as we try to evade the reality that we will die,
and of alienation, which we experience as we try
to bury our true selves in our impersonal social
roles. Our manipulation of nature-our technology
-is seen as manifesting a Faustian will to power.
William Barrett of New York University has
suggested that by making this break from the mainstream of Western philosophy, existentialism leads
us to ideas we are used to associating with Hinduism and Buddhism:
Heidegger [Barrett says] feels that the
whole West is on trial. ... The possibilities
of the atomic bomb forced this before
his mind .... A civilization intent on
mastery and power may also at some
point run amuck. So there may be a point
at which we should stop asserting ourselves and just submit, let be. And if you
wish, there's a sense of something here
which is like the oriental spirit. 31
There is also a sense of being returned to religion, or anyways, of being brought to the
19. L. Thomas, The Medusa and the Snail15-16 (1979).
This book is a collection of occasional essays by Dr. Thomas.
The passage quoted is from an essay entitled, "The Youngest
and Brightest Thing Around."
20. G. Zukav, The Dancing Wuli Masters-An Overview of
the New Physics (1979) (hereinafter cited as "Zukav").
21. Zukav, supra at 66.
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threshold of religion, for we find ourselves
asking, "Where do we go from here?" And that
question, I think, confronts us with a choice that
involves religion. Either our existence means something; or everything means nothing.
I don't mean to suggest that philosophy represents a current carrying us away from science and
back to religion. It doesn't. Consider Marx and
Freud, for example, whose respective philosophies
carry us in opposite directions-opposite not only
to religion but also to each other-Marx locating
the ultimate explanation of human affairs in the
prevailing means of production, and Freud locating
it in our unconscious, repressed, feelings.
Given these complexities, where do we turn in
our effort to ensure that we won't again reason
from the premise that a person is a chattel and
therefore cannot have the power to choose? I have
already said that we can get some help by checking
our premises against the findings of science-so
long as we remember that those findings are subject to change. As regards the help we can get from
philosophy, I like what Isaiah Berlin has said. Berlin
was discussing Turgenev and Chekhov, who described people as they saw them, and made no
effort to give moral instruction to their readers, as
Dickens did, for example. "They were surely right,"
said Berlin, 32 and then went on to say:
It is not the business of the moral philosopher, any more than it is the business
of the novelist, to guide people in their
lives. His business is to face them with
the issues, with the range of possible
courses of action, to explain to them what
they could be choosing and why. He
should endeavor to illuminate the factors
involved .... [l]n this way he can help,
but it is then for each individual and
group, in the light (of which there can
never be enough) of what they believe
and seek after, to decide for themselves.
The philosopher can do no more than
make as clear as he can what is at stake.
But that is to do a very great deal. 33
With the stakes made clear, our ultimate choice
becomes a matter of faith, or religion.
What are the stakes on the table when we talk
about straightening out the premises of our legal
reasoning? Very high, it seems to me. For I agree
22. Zukav, supra at 135.
23. W . Heisenberg, Physics and Philosophy 42 (1958),
Published
by Penn
Law: Legal
Scholarship
Repository, 2014
quoted
by Zukav,
supra at
136.

13

with the existentialists to this extent: I think the
Western world, which is to say, our system of law,
is on trial; and the concern I should like to share
with you is that for all our efforts, or so it seems to
me, the premises of our law have become somehow detached from, and inadequate to respond to,
our circumstances.
I like very much what Ronald Dworkin has said
about justice; it is this:
There are two possible general approaches
to the question of what social arrangements are just. One approach says that the
answer to "What is justice?" depends
upon the answer to a further question,
namely: " What kinds of lives should men
and women lead?" "What counts as
excellence in a human being?" It says:
"Treat people as excellent people, according to some theory of what excellence is, would wish to be treated." The
liberal rejects that approach to justice.
He says that justice is independent of any
particular notion of what the good life
is, so that people who hold very different
kinds of theories about human excellence
can agree about what justice requires. 34
A liberal does not want a society or political theory
that imposes on the individual any particular form
of life as ideal:
Not because the liberal is skeptical, not
because the liberal says there is no answer
to the question how human beings should
live, but rather because he insists ...
that the answer must be given by each
person for himself and that it's the utmost
insult to attempt to decide that question
socially for individuals. 35
I admit to finding this deeply appealing; I
regard it as consistent with-in fact, as simply another way of stating-the idea underlying our Constitution, an idea that I accept as an article of faith
-that every individual has natural rights, which he
retains and never surrenders to society. There is,
however, a qualification. No one should live
unjustly; he should never deny to others the independence that he himself enjoys. And it is here that
24. Zukav, supra at 85-87.
25. /d. at 77-79.
26. B. Magee, Men of Ideas 227-28 (1979) . (Magee interviewed fifteen philosophers for BBC, and the interviews are
collected in this book, which is hereinafter cited as "Magee.")
27. /d. at 229.
28. /d. at 230.
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liberalism, it seems to me, falters. It has not
thought through, in terms of today's circumstances,
how to ensure individual liberty while at the same
time not permitting, and even defending, unfair
inequality. What we need, I suspect, is a new psychology, and a new economics. Rather less of
Jeremy Bentham and Adam Smith. And rather more
of Dr. Thomas's vision-for that matter, St. Francis
of Assisi's vision-of earth as a magnificent creature. You will sense from so vague a prescription
that I am faltering too-which is why I said at the
beginning that I look to you for inspiration. But
whatever the prescription, as Dworkin points out,
liberalism must be "defend[ed] ... from the charge
that it protects individuals at the cost of the welfare
of those at the bottom of society." 36
I do not know whether this defense can, or
will, succeed. But as the white coif is pulled down
over your heads, may I express the hope that you
will enter the lists. If you do, you will need resources beyond those of science, philosophy, and
religion. "Poets," said Shelley, "are the unacknowledged legislators of the world." 37 Remember, then,
what Wordsworth said:
The world is too much with us; late
and soon,
Getting and spending, we lay waste
our powers:
Little we see in Nature that is ours;
We have given our hearts away .... 38
The abstract concepts of legal reasoning all derive
from premises of what is just: corporation; security
interest; restraint on alienation; proximate cause;
mens rea. As you work with these concepts, I beg
of you, except to those you love, do not give your
hearts away.

The LL.M. Experience:
Recollections of a "Lam"
by Morgan McClintock, LL.M.'79
Editor's Note: Graduate students at the University
of Pennsylvania Law School are known affectionately as "Lams" (LL.M.'s). Morgan McClintock,
one of the more vocai"Lams of '79" delivered the
following message to those assembled at the Law
School Commencement in May. His words expressed the sentiments of his colleagues-the 25
international students whose graduate study at
Penn Law Schoof/ed to the degree of Master of
Laws.
Mr. McClintock, a resident of Northern Ireland,
earned a B.A. degree at Trinity College and an LL.B.
at Dublin University. His particular field of interest
is Comparative Public Law and, while working
under the tutelage of Dean james 0. Freedman this
past year at Penn, his research was concentrated in
the areas of American Constitutional and Administrative Law, contrasting the Constitutions of the
United States, the United Kingdom, and Ireland.
Back in Ireland now, Morgan McClintock continues as a lecturer at Ulster College.

29. ld. at 229-30.
30. What follows is largely from Magee's interview of
William Barrett, Professor of Philosophy at New York University, discussing Martin Heidegger and jean-Paul Sartre.
31. Magee, supra at 87.
32. ld. at 32.
33. /d. at 32-33.
34. ld. at 250.
35. ld. at 255.
36. ld. at 255.
37. This is the last sentence of Shelley's "A Defense of
Poetry" (1840).
38. W. Wordsworth, The World.
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Dean Freedman, Faculty, administration, and
fellow graduates, it is an honour for me to be asked
to say a few words on behalf of the LL.M. students.
When I was elected to speak, I accepted with
a degree of reluctance because I couldn't help
thinking of the last occasion on which I addressed
a similar public gathering. Then, I was welcoming
to the college where I lecture the distinguished
British Law Lord and former Chief justice, Lord
MacDermott. But, as I rambled on in my speech, I
was unaware of the presence of a sophisticated
bomb which was quietly ticking away under the
desk at which I spoke. Well, to cut a long story
short, I never managed to complete my "thank
you's" on that occasion-but I did learn a very
basic lesson about public speaking, i.e. the necessity of saying the most important things first, lest
one loses the chance of saying them at all!
And the most important function which I have
today is to thank the Faculty, administration and,
by no means least, the students, who have helped
to make our year so memorable. In particular, we
are grateful to Professor [John 0.] Honnold and
the Graduate Committee for bringing us here in the
first place. Secondly, we thank Dean Christopher
F. Mooney who ensured that, having arrived, we
not only left the Law School from time to time, but
also returned safely after our field visits. This task
became particularly difficult when awkward individuals like myself managed to get lost in the
middle of Washington. Thirdly, I should like to
single out Dean Freedman, who has gone out of his
way to help, encourage, and advise us on many
occasions throughout the academic year.
My first encounter with the Dean was when he
was appointed my tutor last September, and we
met in a Professor's office in the Law School. Some
time later, our second meeting took place in the
Associate Provost's office. By our third meeting, he
has moved into the Dean's office, so it seemed a
wise move to enroll in his course on Administrative
Law before he was promoted again-perhaps
beyond my reach.
It was in Dean Freedman's course that I came
across the statement which for me was undoubtedly
the quote of the year. It comes from the case of
S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp ., where Mr. justice jackson
sums up his dissent in three telling words: "I give
up." Fortunately, none of us reached a similar
conclusion during the year, but for most of the
"Lams," there were sufficient difficulties for us to
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have some sympathy with Mr. justice jackson's cry
of despair. First of all, there was the problem of
language. Many English speakers have been known
to struggle with the intricacies of Anti-trusts,
Admiralty or Advanced Torts, but it has never
ceased to amaze me how it is possible to cope with
these when your mother tongue is japanese, German, French or Chinese. Yet, some foreigners
became so fluent that I have on several occasions
been rescued by a Dutch friend's ability to translate my strange accent for the benefit of a native
Philadelphian! So, on behalf of the whole nonAmerican group, I thank you for your tolerance.
Secondly, we had to cope with the American way
of life. Even after a year here, there still seem to be
some aspects which continue to baffle us. Perhaps
we will never understand why, for example, some
athletes wear their shorts over their tracksuits ; or
how the same branch of MacDonalds can justify
charging two different prices for the same amount
of tea! Finally, we had to adapt to the so-called
"Socratic method." Those of us accustomed to
sleeping our way through lectures faced a rude
awakening through the constant fear of being
"called-on" in class. So at first we complained, we
protested, and we stubbornly argued the merits of
alternative systems. We still do, but as time passed,
I think we came to realise that there must be value
in a system which encouraged us to apply ourselves
throughout the year, and thus to get the most out
of the great opportunities offered here in the
Law School.
Our one regret is that perhaps we did not work
hard enough towards the development of Penn as
a centre of international legal studies. We can only
hope that we have at least helped to lay foundations on which future generations of graduate
students may build. I have no doubt that they, like
us, will be proud to have been at Penn. I am also
confident that at the end of a year they will be
equally glad of an opportunity to say to the Dean ,
to the Faculty, to the administration, and to their
fellow graduates-thank you for a wonderful year!
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Agenda for the "New Law School"

Editor's Note: Louis B. Schwartz, L'35, Beniamin
Franklin Professor of Law, offered the following
creative effort to his colleagues of the Penn Law
Faculty in the summer of 1975. Upon its rereading, we found the work inventive, relevant,
and, most assuredly, authoritative-all attributes
descriptive of Mr. Schwartz as well.

Agenda for the "New Law School"
by Professor Louis 8. Schwartz

Sargentville, Maine, is a place of blissful
peace and surpassing beauty. One's imagination is
freed and one's optimism rises. I tender to my
dear colleagues a set of theses, potential lines of
development, issues worth debating (again) if
only to be sure that old solutions remain valid
against new challenges. The coming year of
interregnum seems a good period for reevaluating
our goals and program, both because the financial
squeeze makes some change inevitable and because
it may help our new leader to have some idea of
where we want to go. My instinct is that there is an
opportunity for a quantum jump in the Law
School's effectiveness and prestige, but that many
changes will have to be made together and quickly
for real impact. I am uncertain as to procedures for
implementing the gorgeous thoughts below, but I
hope a little time can be reserved for general discussion at an early faculty meeting.
The List
Year Round Operation. I favor this because
the school is at less than optimum size and
because continuous use of its plant and nonteaching personnel would lower costs per
student. There would be a larger faculty with
corresponding advantages in double-coverage of
subjects and diversity of interests. More graduates
would strengthen our alumni network and enhance
our prestige. In addition, continuous operation
would enable some students to complete the
course in two rather than three years. Professors
need not teach more, and would have greater
flexibility with regard to terms off.
Admissions. I have the impression that our
admissions process is too complex for the degree
of rationality that can be achieved or for efficient
administration. Apart from applicants who ought
to be and are admitted promptly on the record,
there should be a very large pool from which
selection should be made on a discretionary basis
guided by general criteria debated and approved
by the Faculty. These criteria should refer to
academic performance in rigorous schools and
subjects, diversity of ethnic, geographic, and
experiential background, evidence of strong
motivation, maturity, responsibility. Selection
should not be by time-consuming committee
debate about relative merits of particular candidates, but by plurality of votes of committee
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members individually reviewing files when convenient. There may be room for selection in part
by lot. We should not be constrained by fear or
hope of an exceptional candidate showing up
late; acting promptly on applications at hand, we
should stand ready marginally to exceed the
stipulated class size for a truly outstanding late
applicant. I would formalize and publicize our
interest in receiving transfers from other schools at
the end of the first year (making room, if necessary,
by a more rigorous weeding out at the end of our
own first year). "Recruiting," if carried on, should
be regularized and focused on selected undergraduate schools, which themselves attract a high
quality student body from a national constituency,
e.g. Swarthmore, Princeton, Bryn Mawr. Our
recruiting ambassadors should be chosen from
among the liveliest young personalities on the
Faculty.
Combined 6-year Course. If, as I believe,
substitution of law courses for many undergraduate
courses would up-grade undergraduate education,
it ought to be possible to persuade our own
College and Wharton School, as well as some good
nearby institutions, to authorize the substitution,
confer their own degrees in part on the basis of
subjects taken in the law school, and thus advance
the date of completion of requirements for the law
degree. The shorter combined course would be
attractive to applicants, and would encourage
undergraduate selection of useful pre-law courses.
Curriculum. I regard our curriculum as a
hodge-podge of largely non-sequential courses,
bearing names that over-predict the contents. The
curriculum is poorly designed either for general
education of great lawyers or for vocational
preparation. The Curriculum Committee mediates
the conflicting and sometimes idiosyncratic desires
of individual faculty members without reflecting
any collective philosophy of legal education and
without concern with what is actually taught so
long as the course titles make a plausible mosaic.
The Faculty should adopt a set of curricular
principles for the guidance of the Committee,
including the following:
Structure Without Rigidity. The curriculum
should be designed to maximize the proportion of
our graduates who have been introduced to all
the main branches and aspects of law. The courses
should follow a pedagogically logical sequence. It
is not essential that more courses be "required";
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but the students, most of whom have no decided
opinion as to what a legal education should be,
are entitled to much firmer institutional guidance
than we have provided. Always, however, we
should stand ready to deviate from our curricular
norms when that is warranted by special goals or
qualifications of individual students.
Course Coverage. To the extent required to
integrate the whole law course, the Curriculum
Committee should be authorized to make particular courses responsible for specified subject matter
that might otherwise either be duplicated or be
lost if each instructor assumes that another is
dealing with the matter. Examples are "agency"
(in torts or contracts?), "causation" (torts or
criminal law?), self-incrimination and search law
(criminal procedure or constitutional law?). No
one would be barred from "duplicating," where
his course organization or interests call for it; but
he would not do it inadvertently. No one would
be compelled to devote class hours to material
allocated to his subject by the Curriculum Committee; he might merely assign outside readings
(but with no lesser examination accountability).
The course descriptions printed in the Law School
Bulletin would normally reflect Committee allocations of subject matter, so that personal responsibility of the faculty member and student
expectations would assure adequate attention.
Seminars. "Seminars" are presently offered
and required with little understanding or agreement as to what we mean, want, or expect. The
experience ranges from something indistinguishable from a course, except by small numbers of
students, to writing a substantially unsupervised
paper. It is incumbent on the Curriculum Committee to articulate the aims of the seminar
experience, to differentiate among seminars
according to whether the aim is, for example, to
provide a closely supervised legal writing experience involving relatively conventional research
into legislative and case materials, to do a field
study of facts relevant to a legal doctrine, or to
draft legislation or regulations in a new field where
case guidance is meager and the important
qualifications are imaginative analogies, policy
judgments, and careful craftsmanship. In my
judgment most students would benefit most from
a seminar of the first type. Hopefully, seminars
could be labelled as Type A, B, C, etc. to assist
the student in making an intelligent choice. The
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proposed articulation of our seminar policy would
be useful if for nothing else
but pedagogic guidproblems
ance to young faculty members, whose seminar
experiences have probably been as disorganized
and idiosyncratic as our own program. There
should be a faculty judgment as to the normal
number of seminar offerings, taking into consideration the size of the faculty and the comparative utility of alternative uses of teaching resources .
Legal Writing. I do not believe this is a skill
that can effectively and economically be imparted
otherwise than by integration into a particular
substantive course, where the instructor has a
defined responsibility to go through specified
training operations with a small group of students.
The Curriculum Committee should draft the
specifications.
Reading Courses. A substantial part of law
school education can be guided self-education
outside the classroom. Reading courses can be
prescribed both for summer and in term, with
short-answer comprehension tests and possibly a
few supplementary lectures. The minimum use of
this technique should be for subjects about which
we feel that no graduate should be utterly uninformed, but which an elective system sacrifices,
e.g. Legal Profession, International Law, jurisprudence, Conflict of Laws, Legal History.

Legal Profession and Other "Allocable"
Subjects. As I have just indicated, sensitization to
professional traditions and dilemmas would be
required of every student in any curriculum
acceptable to me. The choice is between a
standard course, a reading course, and allocation
of parts of the subject to other courses. See paragraph B above. For example, problems of conflict
between zeal for client and the lawyer's duty to
the court and society fall naturally into a reasonably comprehensive course on criminal law and
procedure. Problems of business-getting, contingent fees, witness-coaching, and tactical delay
ought not to be ignored in a course on torts that
presumably these days also reaches the "no-fault"
approach to liability.
In other instances, partial dismemberment of
other traditional courses would be intellectually
justified and would enhance realistic dealing with
the subject-matter. Conflict of laws offers an
example. Choice of law and tribunal for auto
accident litigation is much more closely linked
with negligence and other tort law than it is with

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/plj/vol15/iss1/1

the verbally similar choice-of-law-and
tribunal
in family law. To take a different
example, it is more meaningful to discuss injunctions against criminal prosecution in the context of
a civil rights course, injunctions against nuisance
in a property or environment course, and farreaching injunctions commanding affirmative
action in antitrust courses, than to lump these
three together in a course on "equity." Having
introduced the student to such concepts in
particular context, we could offer a more meaningful elective in the third year for comprehensive
and jurisprudential exploration of equity or
conflict of laws.

Sparsely Patronized Courses and Seminars.
A first-class law school must deal with some areas
that appeal to relatively few people. The esoteric
is not necessarily the negligible. If anything it
would be desirable to increase the range of our
offerings in this respect. How to do so is a special
problem for any but the giant schools. I think of
the recurrent but limited demands for courses on
patent law, copyright law, Russian law, Chinese
law, communications law. Our curriculum should,
within reason and by various means, meet such
demands, and the courses should be listed in our
catalogue. The means would include : (i) guided
reading course, which an interested professor
takes on much as he presently takes on an honors
student; (ii) listing in our catalogue appropriate
courses in other graduate departments, e.g.,
history, communications ; (iii) collaboration with
nearby law schools in sharing responsibility for a
set of " exotic" courses, which would be available
to students from any of the schools. A proper
frugality in use of our teaching resources dictates
that courses and seminars with relatively few
takers be offered only in alternate years.
"Pre-Curricular" Courses. I think we should
take a more positive line on preferred preparatory
education. It is clear from the growing sector of
our own curriculum devoted to economics,
accounting, and psychiatry, for example, that we
regard these as cognate to law studies. We ought
to say so, with appropriate elaboration and qualification , in our Bulletin, and reflect that policy in
the exercise of discretion in admissions. If, in
addition, we recommended reading courses in
these areas, the number of studnts sharing the
relevant experiences would be greater than under
the present system , where small minorities elect
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the courses we now provide. While we tell
prospects that the above-mentioned subjects, as
well as statistics, logic, constitutional history,
comparative government, public finance, or
what-not, are useful equipment, we can always
add grandly that we have nevertheless had
magnificent lawyers who came from such diverse
backgrounds as chemistry, astronomy, mathematics, and music.
"How-To" Lectures or Colloquia. Students
often feel, with some justification, that they
emerge with too little preparation for common
practical problems of lawyering. This deficiency in
our program could be partially filled by practitioners' talks on such subjects as (i) common family
arrangements and problems affecting will-making;
techniques of eliciting true desires of testators;
(ii) divorce counseling and negotiations on custody
and property; (iii) buying a house; (iv) comparative advantages of partnership and close corporation; (v) handling a tax-cheating client.

Ne:t..5

Examinations; Grading. I propose the abolition
of separate examinations in each course and the
substitution of a single one-day, or at most twoday, comprehensive examination. This would have
a variety of favorable effects, the most obvious
being the saving of weeks that can be added to
teaching, reducing time professors must devote
to grading papers, simplifying administration, and
facilitating integration of our calendar with that of
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the University. I believe also that the change would
tend to reduce the "exam complex" that weighs
unduly on our educational process. Concentrated
review could not as easily be deferred to end of
term. Efforts to guess what topics the professor will
choose to examine on will have a lower pay-off.
Professors would, and should, be encouraged to
use in-term examinations as pedagogical instruments (i.e. with follow-up analyses) either with or
without grading.
Whether or not the comprehensive exam
proposal is accepted, we must alter the present
grading schedule. It has two fundamental defects:
(i) the line between Q and G makes a sharp
distinction precisely where discrimination is least
meaningful; and (ii) there is no way to express the
distinction between barely acceptable and quite
acceptable. An inadequate recognition of the
latter point is involved in the "Q minus" practice,
which is employed or not employed most
whimsically by different members of the Faculty.
The common attitude of the students towards the
unqualified Q is disappointment, as if it were a Q
minus. Although I should prefer a return to
numerical grading, the least we can do is to
redefine Q as "passable," and to make G the norm
for 50-60% of the class.
law Review. For a long time-and I would
say progressively-the Law Review has suffered
from annual discontinuity of management, from
goof-off of some editors, and from strong competition of other law school "activities." There has
also been a weakening of the bond between
Faculty and Review, less of a feeling that the
Review is "our" publication, the preferred forum
for our intellectual product. Compare recent issues
of Stanford and Yale reviews which were almost
entirely intra-institutional. It would be good for
our Review, the Faculty, and the Law School for
the Faculty to have more responsibility to and for
the Review. If the Faculty agrees, the Law Review
Committee might be asked to implement the idea.
One line of development might be to foster a
sense that faculty members should write for the
years.
Review not less frequently than once in
But the form of the contribution should be much
more within the discretion of the contributor than
the present rigid format of the Review permits.
Informal short comments, as well as formidable
footnote-bristling researches, should be welcomed
-even if ordinary editorial criteria are maintained
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as against outsiders. See, for example, Baxter's
"Parable," 23 Stan. L. Rev. 973 (1971). It may be
also that a member of the Faculty should sit with
the Board of Officers of the Review in its on-going
management.
Faculty. The need I feel here is for cultivating
the sense of community of interest. This suggestion can easily be misunderstood as a call for
institutionalizing sociability. I have no such thing
in mind; it would be artificial and non-productive.
I have in mind, rather, increasing our awareness of
each other's professional interests and enterprises,
generating mutual support and constructive
criticism. We have done a little of that recently in
our occasional "faculty seminars" and in the
Ackerman-inspired Young-Turk conclaves. Building
on these, without supplanting them, I would
propose more frequent faculty seminars with
fewer participants, less formality, and greater
flexibility of format.
For example, Faculty member A might agree
to host for colleague B a discussion of B's draft
paper, orB's proposed application for a foundation grant, or B's ideas for a casebook or treatise,
or B's work with the ACLU or CLS or the Commission on Federal Appellate Jurisdiction, orB's
experiences as Ambassador or researcher in
foreign lands. The aim would be to get five people
together over an extended lunch, in the late
afternoon in someone's office or the faculty
lounge, or in the evening at someone's home.
Bringing together a limited number or core of
specially interested people would be easier than
scheduling a full faculty seminar; but the faculty
as a whole would be notified and invited (without
the pressure of institutional loyalties that sometimes brings along not-entirely-enthusiastic
participants). In addition, the invitation might be
extended to graduate students or to undergraduates that A or B would like to have present.
Occasionally, the focus would be on an interesting
personality from another department or from
public life rather than a member of our own
faculty. In assembling the core group, host A
should make some effort to cut across the normal
social groupings within the Faculty. A's final duty
would be to recruit his successor host, B or C, to
start the process over with a new core group.
This would not be as burdensome as it may
sound in the description. If, as I envision, nearly
everybody would accept his share and if there
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were to be 10 sessions during a school year, a
person would be called upon as host once in
three years and as discussion leader, B, once in
three years. Core groups could be assembled with
an average attendance by each faculty member of
two sessions each year. More frequent attendance
would be desirable and may be anticipated.
Another expression of community should be
a somewhat more structured relationship with new
members of the Faculty and with visiting professors. The dean might quietly invite two or three
members of the Faculty to take special responsibility for a designated newcomer: to orient him
or her to the University, to Philadelphia, and to
the Faculty. Special care should be taken to see
that a newcomer is not socially neglected in the
early months. The practice of visiting classes
should be regularized by a Faculty resolution both
to encourage established members (especially in
the newcomers' fields), to overcome selfconsciousness and inertia, and to induce the
newcomer to regard it as helpful and routine
rather than hosti Ie.

Faculty-Student Relations; Placement.
Although relations between the Faculty and
Student Body are no longer in the crisis stage of a
few years back, we are far from achieving the
ideal sense of community, of shared enterprise,
loyalty, and pride. The spirit of the "Law School
Forum" and perhaps of SAC continues to be
querulous, suspicious, and self-doubting. My
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general diagnosis is that the Faculty has defaulted
on an affirmative obligation to inform and inspire
the student body; Faculty-Student relations tend
to be limited to Faculty reactions to Student
complaints . A positive program is called for. My
suggestion would be a series of " Conversations
about Law and the Law School" starting early in
the First Term. More often than not, they wo11ld
be informal panel discussions involving two or
three Faculty members. Among the topics would
be law study, the role of the lawyer (as seen in
literature as well as in the canons of ethics),
faculty recruitment and activities (a chance to
boast about our involvements on the national
scene), institutional history (Wilson, Sharswood,
books in which the Law School figures, e.g.
Pepper, Philadelphia Lawyer, Solmssen, with his
book, Alexander's Feast), on-going Law School tensions (special admissions, grading, tuition and aid,
the Law School Forum, the Course Evaluation). Such
a program would introduce us as persons in a
favorable setting, give us a chance to defuse
potential issues, and stimulate curiosity about and
pride in the school and the profession . I have
come to believe that our annual luncheon reception is not useful for these purposes. The "facultyadvisor" structure has potentials which can be
fully realized only if someone draws up a statement of norms of faculty activity in this role. I
have heard of outstanding performance; most of
us do little; some do nothing.
As to placement, I am ill-informed; but the
thought has occurred to me that a part of this
function might be delegated to the Alumni
Society, especially for outlying territories.
Alumni. There is a reservoir of talent and interest here that we have used almost exclusively in a
financial way. There might be positive impact even
financially if we broadened our contact. Some
alumni would enliven particular classes in their
field of specialty or could give supplementary lectures. An effort should be made to get more to
write for the Law Review, particularly former editors, and especially on planning, counseling, and
ethical issues; much wisdom lies buried in intraoffice memoranda. I wonder if SAC could be persuaded to accept on its board a representative of
the class that graduated two years before and of
the class that graduated five years before? See also
suggestion in the preceding paragraph regarding
placement.
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Law Library. I believe our library is well run,
but underestimated in the customary rankings of
law libraries. This is because the prevailing ranking
system is crude and arbitrary, being based entirely
on number of books. One of the best things our
library could do for itself and the profession is to
devise a more plausible ranking system, which
would at the same time be a guide to library
management. Factors in addition to number of
books that should figure in assessing a law library
are: number of persons using the library, especially
the number of students in the school; scale of
library service; distribution of the collection among
some major classifications, e.g., exotics, standard
working tools, or intermediate research facilities ;
materials in English, readily accessible and major
foreign languages, or other foreign languages;
duplications; obsolescence (e.g., old editions of
treatises or casebooks); space per faculty-student
reader; facility of access to supplementary
libraries (general university, other law school,
major bar association) . Minds that can quantify
the qualifications of applicants for admission to
law school can devise measurements of these
library dimensions.
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Editor's Note: Dr. Mayer, an Alumna of the Penn
Law School Class of 1975, is Assistant Professor of
Legal Studies at the University of Pennsylvania and
teaches courses in Islamic Law for the University's
joint program in Middle Eastern Law.
The following article appeared originally in
two segments and is reprinted with permission of
The National Law Journal, Volume I, Numbers 25
and 26, March 5, 1979 and March 12, 1979.
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Law in an Islamic State:
The Iranian Equation
by Dr. Ann Elizabeth Mayer, '75
With the creation of Iran's new leaders of an
Islamic republic, speculation has arisen about the
role that Islam and Islamic law, or the shari' a,
would play in the new state. Although the details
of the new system cannot be predicted with any
certainty, a suggestion of the form an Islamic republic might take can be seen by examining some
of the givens in the Iranian equation: the revolutionary conditions there, the Shi'i religion, Iran's
recent history, and the country's presently existing
legal system.
Iran is in the process of restructuring its society, and this revolutionary initiative is apparent in
the manner of interpreting the requirements of
Islamic Law. The late Ali Shari'ati, who wrote highly
influential works on Islamic Law, was instrumental
in recent years in persuading large numbers of
Iranians that the doctrines of medieval Muslim
jurists should be discarded in favor of a new and
revolutionary approach to the sources of law. This
approach is akin to the approach of Catholic doctrine taken by many advocates of the " liberation
theology" in Latin America.
The assumption common to both is that religious doctrine must be liberally reinterpreted and
reworked to enable it to further social goals. As a
result of the efforts of Shari 'ati and others, the current interpretations of the requirements of shari' a
law in Iran differ in many instances strikingly from
those found, say, in Saudi Arabia. That country
remains a highly traditional and so far stable society, where works of medieval jurists remain the
authoritative statements of shari' a law.
That is not to say that none of the distinctive
features of the traditional shari' a will be revived in
Iran. No doubt some will be, but this will be done
selectively because of the new tendency in I ran
toward a result-oriented jurisprudence as opposed
to the Saudi emphasis on doctrinal fidelity and continuity. A republican , constitutional and representative government has been accepted, as it seems,
as a starting point for the new state. In and of itself,
this constitutes a break with traditional shari' a rules
as understood in the Shi'i faith.
The vast majority of Iranians adhere to the
Twelver sect of Shi'i Islam. In the traditional
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Twelver Shi'i doctrine, a republican government
could not have enjoyed any legitimacy. Indeed, the
Shi'is split off from the majority Sunni branch of
Islam because the Shi'is believed that leadership in
Islam, in which the leader was vested with both
political and religious authority, passed by heredity
among the descendants of the Prophet Muhammad
(570?-632).
These hereditary leaders, or Imams, were
divinely inspired and mediated between the community and God. When in 874 the twelfth Imam disappeared without leaving any descendants, the
lynch pin of the Twelver Shi'i system of government
was removed, and the period of so-called occultation began. Until the twelfth Imam returns from his
occultation, Shi'is are powerless to create a government that is legitimate in religious terms. As a
result, for many centuries Shi'is of the Twelver sect
have rejected and resisted any assertion of governmental authority and eschewed involvement in
politics. 1
The only system of guidance for the community was the shari' a. The u/ama, or learned men of
religion, who were its authoritative interpreters,
wielded great power. Naturally, they were cast in
the role of perennial opposition to any governmental authority. It is only recently, beginning in
the last century, that Shi'is have seriously reexamined this position. Since then there has been a
growing trend among the u/ama to advocate political action, particularly such as would curb the misrule and abuse of power that has characterized the
reigns of many modern Shahs. Political involvement
and opposition to the monarchy finally led the
u/ama to the forefront of the advocates of a republican form of government. 2
Having come to terms with republican government, where can the u/ama and others who wish to
give it an Islamic character look for the Islamic
principles that will give it legitimacy? In looking for
these principles, attention will undoubtedly turn to
the prime sources of the shari' a for guidance. These
are the Quran and the sunna.
The Quran is believed by Muslims to be the
Word of God as revealed to mankind by his messenger, the Prophet Muhammad. As such, it is the
cornerstone of Islamic thought. However, it is a very
brief Scripture of approximately 6,000 verses, only
one tenth of which is concerned with legislation in
our sense of the word. One searches in vain in this

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

23

one tenth for explicit guidance on how the Islamic
community should be governed . The verses are
largely concerned with family law and inheritance,
although some also treat contracts, crimes, and
other matters. (The lack of express commands on
the subject is one reason why over the centuries
Muslims of various Sunni and Shi'i sub-sects have
disputed what scheme of government is most truly
Islamic.)
Much more voluminous than the Quran is the
sunna, collected reports of the Prophet's statements
or actions regarding a wide range of problems. As
a perfect human being, the Prophet by his example
is thought to have set the standards by which subsequent generations of Muslims should be guided.
The Shi'is treat the examples set by their own
Imams as an additional source of law. In particular,
they seek to emulate the Prophet's son-in-law, Ali
Abu Talib, who ruled as Caliph from 656 until his
assassination in 661. If I ran's new leadership now
tries to extract its principles of government from
the models of government by the Prophet and the
Caliph Ali, as it is suggested that they may try to do,
this will be in conformity with Shi'i theories of the
sources of the shari' a.
At first it may seem impossible to derive the
constitutional framework for a modern state from a
study of the elements of government of the nascent
Islamic community of the seventh century. But the
goal may not seem so unrealistic if one recalls how
far decisions in the area of constitutional jurisprudence by the U.S. Supreme Court have taken

Iran's History of Liberal Interpretation
Of Religious Doctrine Suggests That
Republican and Islamic Principles
Can Coexist
the United States from, say, the bare bones of the
Fourth or the Fourteenth Amendments. The Shi'i
mujtahids are those ulama regarded as qualified to
interpret the shari' a. Among these are a handful in
each generation who are recognized by popular
acclamation as ayatollahs, scholars whose teachings
are widely considered authoritative. (Ayatollah
Khomeini is merely one of several scholars currently enjoying this distinction.) The ayatollahs and
other mujtahids can expand and adapt legal principles to suit changed circumstances just as the
Supreme Court has been known to do. They will be
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confronted by the fervent aspirations of the populace for a government on democratic lines, for an
economic order that will result in a fairer distribution of the nation's wealth, and for social justice.
They will want to harmonize the requirements of
Islamic Law with these popular goals. 3 Social justice
is likely to receive particular attention in the restructuring of power and economic relations,
because in the canons of Shi'i jurisprudence substantive justice ranks as perhaps the most fundamental principle.
The u/ama should be prepared to welcome a
constitution for reasons that are peculiar to the
Iranian political situation. According to strict shari' a
theory, they should not do so, for the shari' a does
not recognize the legitimacy of any human lawmaking activities. All law-making power is ultimately vested in Allah, and the Prophet, as the
divinely inspired messenger of Allah, partakes of
this power-as do the Shi'i Imams. For this reason
Saudi Arabia, which has demonstrated a concern to
abide scrupulously by the shari' a, does not have a
constitution .
The Iranian u/ama have become largely reconciled to the notion that the state must rest on a
constitution due to I ran's unhappy experience of
foreign domination since the British and the Russians began pressing in earnest for concessions in
the late 19th century. The lack of a constitutionand of constitutional checks on the monarchy, in
particular-is thought to have facilitated the expansion of foreign interests and influence in Iran, an
expansion to which the majority of Iranians,
whether secular or religious, have been opposed.
Constitutionalism therefore became linked with
Iranian nationalism, and the u/ama have figured
among the constitution's strongest supporters. 4
The 1907 Iranian Constitution establishes a
constitutional monarchy with a Majlis, or parliament. The monarchy will certainly be abolished,
but the u/ama will probably advocate a representative legislative body to be elected by universal
suffrage. Because the greatest support for religion
is among the masses, not the elite, in Middle Eastern
countries, a broad electoral base will tend to reinforce the power of the u/ama.
The 1907 Constitution in its granting of lawmaking authority to human legislators, did not
comply with the shari' a. Again, taking the examples
of Saudi Arabia to illustrate what a consistent
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application of the traditional legal principles would
lead to, one finds that in Saudi Arabia there are no
laws aside from the shari' a sources and their
juristic elaboration. Such enactments as have had
to be adopted to cope with its radically altered
social and economic circumstances are denied the
status of law and are treated as mere regulations of
an administrative character.
In Iran, in contrast, the capacity of a representative legislature to make laws has long been
established. In 1907 the consent of the Iranian
ulama to the legislative prerogatives of the Majlis
was at least partly induced by a provision in the
Constitution according to which all laws would be
subject to review by a committee of ulama. The
latter were entitled to veto any that conflicted with
the shari' a. The u/ama will expect that any parliament that is set up pursuant to a modification of
the 1907 constitutional scheme will likewise have a
provision assuring that the u/ama retain a right to
veto unacceptable legislation. Indeed, they may
well press for stronger guarantees of their veto
power, since their experience under the monarchy
was that the provision for review by the u/ama was
consistently honored in the breach.
What are the prospects for Iran's current legal
system under an Islamic republic? Beginning in
1928 Iran embarked on a process of reception of
Western law on the Continental European model.
It now possesses what is fundamentally a Westernized system , albeit with the incorporation of certain
rules from the shari' a. Western law has been received everywhere in the Islamic Middle East outside Saudi Arabia, and once implanted it has
rapidly taken root. To turn back the clock at this
juncture and attempt to replace the legal system by
one along traditional lines would be very difficult.
In Libya, for example, where an islamicizing
trend has already made itself felt, there has been a
retention of the legal system that was set up in the
1950s along Franco-Italian lines, and various rules
derived from the shari' a have simply been inserted
in appropriate sections of what are basically still
Western codes. It appears that a similar process is
underway in Pakistan . Iran's Islamic republic is
likely to take the same approach. What one can expect to see is enactment of certain laws that reflect
the more important shari' a rules. In particular, such
rules as are embodied in the text of the Quran will
probably be enacted into law.
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An area where such legislative initiatives can
be anticipated is the criminal law. The shari' a law
affecting crimes is often confused with police practices in Saudi Arabia as reported in sensationalist
articles in the press. In fact, the shari'a law and the
retribution meted out by zealous Saudi police are
not necessarily one and the same any more than
police practices elsewhere in the world correspond
regularly to the niceties of the law.
The most important crimes are the hadd crimes
embodied in the Quran. (There is little enthusiasm
for reviving the large remainder of traditional criminal law for offenses know as ta'zir.) Because so few
crimes are mentioned in the Quran, those that are
may be taken to be particularly heinous in the sight
of Allah. The five hadd crimes are fornication,
slanderous accusations of unchastity, consumption
of alcohol, theft, and highway robbery. 5 For the
penalties for these crimes to apply, many preconditions must be met and steep evidentiary hurdles
scaled. For example, the famous penalty for theft,
amputation of the hand, applies only when an item
of a certain minimum value has been taken by
stealth from a protected place by a sane adult and
carried away. It does not apply when the item taken
is public property, easily perishable, life
plant
or
animals in their natural state, something to which
the thief has a colorable claim, property of near
relations, or property from a house that he has been
permitted to enter; nor does it apply to acts of
embezzlement.
Proof standards for hadd crimes are high, requiring either the eyewitness testimony of two
reputable, male Muslims or the confession of the
accused, which may be retracted up to the time of
punishment.
In the case of the crime of fornication, the
quantum of proof is so high that one can plausibly
contend that the rules are designed with a view to
concealing the infraction rather than revealing it
and punishing the offender. Four reputable, male
Muslim eyewitnesses to the very act must testify if
the guilty party does not confess. There is a powerful disincentive to offering testimony in such cases :
if the requisite standards for the proof of fornication are not met-three witnesses testify, say,
rather than four-any persons who have testified
become liable to the penalty for slanderous accusations of unchastity, which is eighty lashes. A person who has confessed to fornication is supposed
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to be encouraged to retract the confession and is
to be reminded of the numerous legal defenses and
excuses that the shari' a offers to the person charged
with fornication . Thus, even if these hadd crimes
are reinstated, they will, if traditional standards are
observed, not have widespread application.
The traditional hadd penalties are harsh , but
it is improbable that they will be applied in all their
pristine rigor due to the fact that Iran has experienced such acculturation in the last decades by
reason of Iranians' extensive contacts with the
West. In the past the very awfulness of the hadd
penalties was seen as an asset ; these gruesome
punishments were thought to have a salutary deterrent effect. To heighten the impact a hand might
be chopped off in public (as still happens in Saudi
Arabia), the stump cauterized in boiling oil, and the
culprit paraded around with the severed extremity
hung about his neck.

Many religious leaders think the lack
of constitutional checks has facilitated
foreign expansion in Iran in the past.
In Libya, where the hadd for theft was recently
reinstated, the legislators had no stomach for such
practices. With an interesting combination of
humanitarian concern and pious deference to the
requirements of the shari' a, the Libyan law calls for
the amputation to be carried out as a regular surgical procedure in a hospital, for the accused to be
examined beforehand and placed under anesthesia
during the operation, and for all precautions to be
taken to insure a successful recuperation . These
requirements betray a certain uneasiness about the
severity of the penalty, and similar reactions in Iran
can be expected to mitigate, if not eliminate, the
harshest features of the traditional penalties.
How minorities will be treated in an avowedly
religious state has provoked concern . Jews and
Christians, as adherents of revealed religions, are
assured a protected-though subordinate- status
under the shari' a. Among the disabilities that traditionally attached to that status are exclusion from
military service and from public office (though this
rule was often ignored in practice) and liability for
a modest annual tax. The imposition of these traditional disabilities is not supported by all Muslims,
and it is questionable whether the new regime will
require such discriminatory measures.
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The goodwill of the new regime will be tested
more severely with regard to its treatment of the
Bahais, whom Muslims do not recognize as protected adherents of a revealed religion, tending to
see in them renegades from Islam. Conceivably, the
death penalty for apostasy from Islam will be introduced, a shari'a rule that recently came close to
being reinstated in Egypt at the behest of Muslims
angered by defections.
A significant conflict exists between shari' a
laws affecting the family and inheritance and the
reforms introduced by the Iranian Family Protection

The Reinstatement of Strict Religious
Principles Will Be Circumscribed by
Existing Institutions and Practices Despite
the Influence of Ayatollah Khomeini
Acts of 1967 and 1975. The reform laws eliminated
some of the prerogatives formerly enjoyed by Muslim husbands and accorded new rights to wives,
both in derogation of shari'a rules. These acts imposed various reforms: eliminating the husband's
right to unfettered extra-judicial repudiation of the
wife; subjecting the husband's formerly unqualified
right to enter into a polygamous union to a requirement that he first obtain authorization from a court
(which requires him to establish his ability to support more than one wife and to treat them equally);
requiring the wife's consent to any subsequent
polygamous union except in certain specified circumstances (as when she has deserted the husband); and giving the wife and husband the same
right to seek a divorce, but only in court and only
for certain enumerated grounds.
Although Muslim women have enjoyed very
favorable treatment in Islamic Law with respect to
contractual capacity and control over their property, they have had a distinctly inferior position on
the domestic scene, and any abrogation of the laws
of 1967 and 1975 would be a step in the direction
of again relegating them to a position of subjugation and inferiority vis-a-vis their husbands. Since
such a move would be perceived as a significant
step backwards, the Islamic republic may well hesitate before proceeding to cancel these reforms. The
shari' a does not call for segregation of the sexes or
the wearing of the chador, so any insistence on
these practices in the aftermath of the Revolution
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will be the product of a cultural reflex in reaction
to the perceived decline in standards of modesty
and morality rather than a response dictated by
legal requirements.
In the light of the preceding it is possible to
make some generalizations about the proposed
Islamic republic in Iran. Iran is not going to be
dominated by mullas with a medieval mentality in
view of how Shi'i legal thought has increasingly
taken into account social change and political
reality. Iran's legal and political development has
reached such a stage that the reinstatement of
shari' a will be circumscribed by existing institutions
and practices. The republic will be Islamic in the
sense that Islam will enjoy the status of a highly
favored state religion.

1. Leonard Binder, "The Proofs of Islam: Religion and
Politics in Iran," in George Makdisi, ed., Arabic and Islamic
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Rosenthal, Islam and the Modern Nation State (Cambridge,
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The faculty
Associate Dean Morris S. Arnold
became Director of the Office of
the President of The University of
Pennsylvania on September 1,
1979. He will remain a member of
the Law Faculty although his
teaching load will be reduced
somewhat.
Professor Alexander Capron will
be on sabbatical leave during the
1979-80 academic year. He will be
collaborating with Dr. jay Katz of
Yale Law School on the preparation of a casebook on "Disclosure
and Consent," which examines
decisionmaking in lawyer-client,
as Well as physician-patient, interactions. This work is supported in
part by The Commonwealth Fund.
In September, Professor Capron
presented a paper, "Is Consent
Always Necessary?" at a conference on social science re5earch at
Georgetown University.
Dean james 0. Freedman served
as a member of the faculty of the
Salzburg Seminar in American
Studies during July. He lectured
on "The Crisis in the American
Administrative Process" to the
German and American Lawyers
Association in Munich and Berlin
(both in early August). Dean
Freedman was named to the Board
of Directors of the World Affairs
Council of Philadelphia and to the
Board of Trustees of the Jewish
Publication Society.

Professor George L. Haskins has
spent much of the summer at work
on source materials relating to aspects of legal transplants (laws
and institutions) from England to
the early American colonies. He
has also begun a preliminary study
of the Federal Bar and the Su-
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preme Court in the early 19th
Century.
Professor Noyes Leech lectured on
Reform of United States Corporation Law at the European University Institute in Florence, Italy
this past June. The Institute is a
graduate school supported by the
members of the european community offering programs in law
and the social sciences. It is the
first european university since
medieval times. Professor Klaus
Hopt, who was Visiting Professor
at the University of Pennsylvania
this spring, is a member of the
faculty of the Institute.
From july 7-14, Mr. Leech attended a seminar of the International Faculty for Corporate and
Capital Market Law, studying the
law of Brazil in Rio de janiero. The
International Faculty is an outgrowth of the program of the Law
School's Center for Study of Financial Institutions. Members of the
faculty, in addition to Professor
Leech, Professor Mundheim and
Professor Morris Mendelson of the
University's Finance Department,
include lawyers, law professors
and economists from the United
States, japan, the United Kingdom,
France, Germany, Switzerland and
Brazil. The Brazilian seminar completed a five-year cycle during
which the group studied corporate
and capital market law in the
home country of each of the
members. Seminars are planned
for Belgium, the Netherlands and
the european community in 1980.
Thereafter, the faculty plans to
offer a series of public seminars in
various countries.

Pennsylvania Schools of Medicine
and Social Work, which was presented on a local radio station in
early july.
Professor Edward Sparer, Director
of the University of Pennsylvania
Health Law Project, was a speaker
at a conference entitled "New
Jersey: Our State of Health" at the
Robeson Student Center of Rutgers University in Newark.
Professors Ralph S. Spritzer and
Paul Bender were retained by the
Commonwealth to defend the
Rules in the United States Supreme
Court in the case of Philadelphia
Newspapers Inc. eta/. v. Han .
Domenic D. jerome eta/.
Various news media challenged
the constitutionality of provisions
of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure authorizing trial
judges, on motion of the defendant, to conduct pretrial suppression hearings in camera . Unsuccessful in the state courts, the
media appealed to the Supreme
Court which, on June 26, 1979,
sustained the Commonwealth 's
position, dismissing the appeal.

Assistant Dean Arnold J. Miller
participated in a panel discussion
on graduate education with representatives of the University of
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'29
Irvin Stander of Philadelphia was appointed Chairman of
the Workers' Compensation Committee of the Philadelphia Bar
Association. His articles in the
Pennsylvania Law Journal column
"Workers' Compensation Corner"
are now being published in book
form by The Legal lntelligencer.
'38

H. Clayton Louderback, a
senior partner in the Philadelphia
firm of Obermayer, Rebmann,
Maxwell & Hippell, was honored
at the annual meeting of the
Southeastern Pennsylvania Chapter of the American Heart Association. He received a medallion in
recognition of his service as Chairman of the Association's Board of
Governors for the past two years.
Irving R. Segal, a senior partner in the Philadelphia firm of
Schnader, Harrison, Segal and
Lewis, was elected Secretary of the
American College of Trial Lawyers
at its annual membership meeting
in August, 1979.

'41

Michael C. Rainone was
re-elected Secretary of the Philadelphia Trial Lawyers Association.
He was also re-appointed to a
6-year term to the Board of
Trustees at the Community College of Philadelphia, where he
serves on the Executive Committee, as Chairman of the Community Relations Committee.

'43

William B. Johnson delivered the speech, "Profits and Progress" to the joint meeting of the
Rotary Clubs of Haddonfield and
Moorestown, New Jersey in May.
Mr. Johnson is Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer of IC Industries,
Inc. and its subsidiaries which include: the Illinois Central Gulf
Railroad; Pepsi Cola General Bot-

tiers, Inc.; Midas-1 nternational
Corp.; and Continental Illinois
National Bank and Trust Co., of
Chicago. He is also a Director of
the Transportation Association of
America and the Association of
American Railroads.

'48
Harry L. Lees, Jr., of
Quakertown, Pennsylvania, was
elected President of the Bucks
County Bar Association. He is a
member of the firm of Lees and
Lees Associates.
'49

. J. Carter, Senior
Loms
Commissioner of the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission,
is viewed nationally as an expert
on the new National Energy Act.
In May 1979, he was asked back
again to Washington to speak to a
large group of lawyers and utility
executives on the Public Utility
Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA).
His earlier speech last October
touched on the issue of its constitutionality. The State of Mississippi
must have been listening. They
have sued to have the Act declared
a violation of the Tenth Amendment.
'50

Fred R. Huehnergarth of
Lancaster, Pennsylvania, has been
promoted to Corporate Manager
of Employee Benefits at Carpenter
Technology Corporation, Reading,
Pennsylvania.

'51

Hon. Norma L. Shapiro of
the United States District Court,
Eastern District of Pennsylvania,
participated in a seminar, "The
Jewish Woman Today" sponsored
by the Federation of Jewish Agencies Women's Council of Philadelphia this past June.

'53
Frederick T. Bebbington
of Yardley, Pennsylvania, has been
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appointed chairman of the By-laws
Committee of the Bucks County
Bar Association.
Hon. William E. Mikell has resigned as Judge of the Vermont
District Court to resume a private
law practice. His new firm, Davison & Mikell, Inc., has offices at
2 Burlington Square, P.O. Box 530,
Burlington, and Mountain Road,
P.O. Box 960, Stowe, Vermont.
C. Bowman Strome, Jr., VicePresident and Deputy General
Counsel of The Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United
States, was elected to the Board of
Directors of the American Arbitration Association. Mr. Strome resides in Briarcliff Manor, New
York.
Hon. Alfred T. Williams, Jr., of
Bethlehem, Pennsylvania has been
named by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court as acting President
Judge of the Northampton County
Court pending a formal commission to the position by the Secretary of the Commonwealth.

'54

Hon. Ben Kaito was
sworn in as a per-deim Oahu District Court Judge in March by the
Hawaii State Chief Justice, William
Richardson.
Robert Montgomery Scott,
a partner in the Philadelphia firm
of Montgomery, McCracken,
Walker & Rhoads, has been
elected Chairman of the Board of
Trustees of the Institute for Cancer
Research, Philadelphia.
William Thatcher of Quakertown, Pennsylvania, has been appointed chairman of the Merit
Selection of Judges Committee of
the Bucks County Bar Association.
Thomas W. Waters, Jr., of
Norristown, Pennsylvania, is VicePresident of the Montgomery Bar
Association.
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'55

Lionel Wernick continues

as Vice President and Senior
Counsel to the major New York
advertising agency, Batten, Barton,
Durstine & Osborn. In addition to
holding down his responsibilities
there, he is currently Associate
Professor in the Business Schools
of New York University and Pace
University.
His negotiations with commercial talent sometimes brings
him in touch with well-known
celebrities like the one to the left
of Mr. Wernick in the above photograph.

'57

'60
Edward I. Dobin of
Morrisville, Pennsylvania, has been
appointed to direct committees
on finance, property and operations for the Bucks County Bar
Association.

President of the Camden County
Bar Association. He is also adjunct
Professor of Trial Advocacy at Rutgers University Law School.
William B. Moyer of Doylestown, Pennsylvania, has been appointed Chairman of a Public
Service Committee for the Bucks
County Bar Association.

'62

joseph F. Battle was
nominated to the candidacy of
Mayor of Chester, Pennsylvania,
in the recent May primary election. He began his political career
in 1965 as Assistant City Solicitor
and became City Solicitor in 1977.
He was Chairman of the Chester
Housing Authority of Commissioners from 1968 to March 1979.

John Douglas Cummings,

a former member of the State Rating Bureau at the Massachusetts
Division of Insurance, has formed
a consulting firm-Chang & Cummings, 6 Beacon Street, Boston,
Massachusetts 02106. Mr. Cummings will be involved in the new
field of "readability," which involves the rewriting of complex
legal and other business documents into simplified form. He
was one of the faculty at a workshop on the new and expanding
field of simplification in New York
City in March.

'59

John J. Francis, Jr., of South
Orange, New Jersey, has been
elected Chairman of the Board of
Trustees of The Hospital Center at
Orange. Mr. Francis is a partner in
the firm of Shanley and Fisher,
Newark, New Jersey, and is a
member of the American College
of Trial Lawyers and the American
Bar Association.
Jack A. Rounick of Norristown, Pennsylvania, has been appointed Chairman of the Family
Law Section of the Pennsylvania
Bar Association . He has been a
Lecturer for a PBI series on Family
Law in Philadelphia, Pittsburgh,
and Harrisburg.
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William H. Eastburn, Ill,

of Doylestown, Pennsylvania, has
been appointed chairman of the
Nominating Committee of the
Bucks County Bar Association.

Robert A. Miller of Monmouth Beach , New Jersey, has
been promoted to Senior VicePresident for Prudential Property
and Casualty Insurance Company,
responsible for the claims, law
and operations departments.

'61

Edward N. Adourian, Jr.,

'64
Beryl Dean has been appointed the new Director of the
Philadelphia Bar Association's
Placement Services, with the responsibilities of directing the
Association's Professional Placement Service, matching attorneys
with prospective employers and
offering guidance and assistance
for attorneys who are looking for
placement opportunities. She was
former Director of the Office of
Career Advising and Resources at
the University of Pennsylvania.

of Moorestown, New Jersey, is
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'65
Jeffrey B. Schwartz became affiliated with W. Thomas
Berriman, Suite 700, Valley Forge
Plaza, King of Prussia, PA 19406,
in the private practice of law as of
May 1, 1979. Mr. Schwartz, former
chief counsel of the Pennsylvania
Department of Health, worked
under Secretary of Health Dr.
Leonard Bachman for 5 years. His
service included enforcement of
minimum standards of care for
nursing home patients, and vindication through the judicial process
of health department decisions
limiting unnecessary hospital
expenditures.
'66
Gordon J. Lipson has become a partner in the Rochester,
New York firm of Goldstein, Goldman, Kessler & Underberg, 1800
Lincoln First Tower, Rochester,
New York 14604.
Bernhardt K. Wruble has been
appointed temporary director of
the newly·created Office of Government Ethics. He will organize
the Office, issue regulations and
develop policy, but will not head
it permanently. Mr. Wruble was
principal deputy general counsel
for the United States Army, and
practiced law for 10 years with the
New York firm of Simpson,
Thacher & Bartlett.

of Common Pleas since 1974 and
Executive Director of the Philadelphia Commission for Effective
Criminal justice, has been appointed by Pennsylvania Governor
Dick Thornburgh to membership
on the Pennsylvania Commission
on Crime and Delinquency.
Dale Penneys Levy of the
Philadelphia firm Blank, Rome,
Comisky & McCauley, represented the Women's Rights
Committee of the Philadelphia
Bar Association in co-sponsoring,
with the junior League· of Philadelphia, a day-long conference
on Women's Rights in March.
Stephen Shoeman of Princeton, New jersey, was the recipient
of the Second Place Prize in the
United States Jaycees national
speak-up competition held in
Nashville, Tennessee, achieving recognition by that organization as one of America's outstanding speakers.
Sharon Kaplan Wallis, former
chief of the domestic abuse unit
of the Philadelphia District
Attorney's office, has been named
Assistant to the Dean of Women's
Affairs at the Medical College of
Pennsylvania. Ms. Wallis is founding president of the Philadelphia
Women's Political Caucus.

'68

'67
Walter W. Cohen, Prison
Master for the Philadelphia Court

Charles H. Norris, Jr.,
Chairman of the Board of Artemis
Corporation and Chairman of the
Executive Committee of Remington Business Systems of New
jersey, was appointed by Pennsylvania Governor Dick Thornburgh
to the Pennsylvania Commission
on Crime and Delinquency. Mr.
Norris lives in Coatesville, Pennsylvania.
James Redeker of Philadelphia is a member of a steering
committee that will oversee the
National Legal Resource Center
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for Child Advocacy. The Center,
created last year through a
$175,000 federal grant and inspired by a child advocacy program using volunteer lawyers, was
first organized by the Philadelphia
Young Lawyers Section of the
Philadelphia Bar Association in
1971.
Peter S. Thompson of Doylestown, Pennsylvania, has been appointed Chairman of the Legal
Periodicals Committee of the
Bucks County Bar Association.
Mark G. Yudof of Austin,
Texas, was awarded the james R.
Dougherty Chair for Faculty Excellence for the 1979-1980 academic year at the University of
Texas Law School. He was appointed chairman of the National
Study Group on Legal and Governmental Studies of the Nationa l
Institute of Education.
'69
Marjorie Marinoff of
Philadelphia has been named a
member of the steering committee that will oversee the National
Legal Resource Center for Child
Advocacy in Washington, D.C.
Richard P. Sills has become a
partner in the firm of Ginsburg,
Feldman and Bress, 1700 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. where he has practiced
since 1974. He lectures in the
graduate tax programs at the
Georgetown and George Washington University Law Schools.
Mr. Sills was law clerk to judge
Charles R. Simpson of the United
States Tax Court, and was an
Assistant Branch Chief in the IRS
Chief Counsel's Office in Washington.
Lynn Saul Moore is presently
in private practice at 222 North
Court, Tucson, Arizona 85701. Ms.
Moore is involved in a general
practice-family law, litigation,
representation of feminist organi-
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zations and businesses, etc. She is
also doing tax exemption applications for non-profit organizations
and is "keeping a hand" in
socially-relevant housing developments. Her son and daughter are
aged 9 and 7 respectively.

'70

Sheldon A. Halpern has
been named Regional Counsel of
Federated Department Stores Inc.,
and is moving from Cincinnati,
Ohio, to Los Angeles, California.
Steven Waxman of Philadelphia has been named Chairman of a steering committee
that will oversee the National
Legal Resource Center for Child
Advocacy. Waxman, as former
Chairman of the Philadelphia
Young Lawyers Section of the
American Bar Association, was
one of the moving forces toward
the creation of the Center located
in Washington, D.C. Its purpose
is to raise professional awareness,
improve professional skills and
foster interdisciplinary cooperation with respect to the treatment
and protection of abused and
neglected children.

'71 James H. Manning, Jr. is
Assistant Professor of Law at
Villanova University Law School.
William J. Moses, a partner
in the Philadelphia firm of
Dilworth, Kalish, Levy & Kauffman, was reelected President of
the Philadelphia Housing Development Corporation for a third
term.

'73

Richard 0. Gauthier has

been appointed assistant counsel in the Legal Department of
Sheraton Hotels and Inns Worldwide. Headquartered in Boston,
Mr. Gauthier will take part in
negotiations for new Sheraton
management contracts in addition
to other duties.

John B. Herron has become
associated with the Philadelphia
firm of Blank, Rome, Comisky &
McCauley. He was formerly associate counsel with Commonwealth
Land Title Insurance Company in
Philadelphia.
David Kraut of Philadelphia
has been named Chief Regional
Civil Rights Attorney for The Department of Health, Education and
Welfare in Region II I, which oversees the Philadelphia area. Mr.
Kraut worked previously with
Community Legal Services here.
His new duties consist of supervising a 9-lawyer unit which serves
as legal counsel to The Office of
Civil Rights, an agency responsible for HEW's enforcement of the
Civil Rights statutes and regulations governing recipients of HEW
federal funding.
Allen E. Rennett has become
a partner in the firm of Richards,
Watson, Dreyfuss & Gershon,
333 South Hope Street, Los
Angeles, California 90017.
Sherrie Raiken Savett, a member of the Board of Managers of
the Law Alumni Society and a
partner in the Philadelphia firm of
Berger & Montague, P.C., and her
husband, Stuart H. Savett, were
the 1979 recipients of the Torch of
Learning Award given by the
American Friends of the Hebrew
University.
Michael K. Schonbrun was
appointed Vice-President of the
National Jewish Hospital and
Research Center in Denver,
Colorado. Mr. Schonbrun has
served as Assistant Director for
Medical Care Regulation and
Development for the Colorado
Health Department.
Marjorie A. Silver has been
named Chief Regional Civil Rights
Attorney for the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare in

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

31

Region II (New York). Ms. Silver
has been with HEW since 1974
and recently spent 6 months doing
civil litigation in the United States
Attorney's Office for the Southern
District of New York. In her new
position, Ms. Silver supervises a
unit of 9 other attorneys, the unit
serving as legal counsel to the
Office of Civil Rights, an office
responsible for HEW's enforcement of the Civil Rights statutes
and regulations governing recipients of HEW federal funding.

'7 4
Susan Katz Hoffman is an
associate with the management
labor law firm of Deutsch, Weintraub & Glazerman, 99 High Street,
Boston, Massachusetts 02110. She
has recently been appointed cochair of the Committee on Pension, Welfare and Related Plans of
the American Bar Association's
Labor Law Section.
Melanie J. Rowland, Assistant
Dean at the University of Washington Law School, contributed
major part of a supplement to the
Community Property Deskbook,
April1979. She was elected copresident of Washington Women
Lawyers, and was appointed to
the Board of Directors of Northwest Women's Law Center.
Stuart Weisburg, of Silver
Spring, Maryland, married Elizabeth Krucoff in June, 1979. He is
an attorney with the National
Labor Relations Board in Wash ington, D.C.

'78
H. Vincent McKnight is
law clerk to Judge William C.
Pryor of the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals.
'79

Pamela J. Murphy of
Philadelphia is law clerk to Hon.
Leonard Sugerman, L'55, of the
Chester County, Pennsylvania,
Court of Common Pleas.
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From The Editor

Reunions, Etc.

Thanks! Your response to our request for
"news about you" has expanded our Alumni Briefs
section considerably in our past two issues. Do
keep us posted. What you are professionally or
otherwise might be enlightening to other Alumni as
well as to your former classmates.

This spring the Classes of 1929, '32, '39, '49
February, and '49 June, held reunions unique to
their particular needs and wishes. Elegant hotels in
Philadelphia serviced the Classes of 1929, 1939,
and June, 1949. The Class of 1932 held its annual
dinner at the University of Pennsylvania Faculty
Club, whereas the February '49 Class celebrated at
the Locust Club of Philadelphia.
The Classes of 1954 and 1959 will be holding
their respective 25th and 20th Reunions both on
October 20. The Academy of Music Ballroom will
be the site of the Class of 1954's twenty-fifth milestone, while the Class of '59 will meet at the Law
School for its celebration .
We encourage all class members who foresee
reunions in their future or who just wish to "gettogether" to contact Libby Harwitz at the School's
Office of Alumni Affairs.

Have We Heard From You Lately?
We want "all the news that's fit to print" about
you-professionally or in general. The Journal's
Alumni Briefs section is the perfect forum for keeping in touch with classmates and with other Alumni.
Information as well as your informal photographs
are welcome. Please use the space below:

Name and Class : _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
What's New : _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

CORRECTION
In our summer issue we confused the name of Ira
Mark Goldberg, who is not an Alumnus of the
Law School, with that of Ira Morton Goldberg,
who is a member of the Class of 1967.

Return to :
The Law Alumni Journal
The University of Pennsylvania Law School
19104
3400 Chestnut Street
Philadelphia, PA
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Ira Morton Goldberg has not taken a new
position in Lackawanna County, as we erroneously reported, but continues his general practice in
Cherry Hill, New Jersey, specializing in appellate
practice, choice of law, and constitutional questions.
We regret our error and apologize to our
Alumnus for any embarassment we may have
caused him.
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IN MEMORIAM
'12

Curtis G. Culin, Jr., Cranford, NJ,
April 28, 1979
Harry M. Nofer, Philadelphia, PA,
June 15, 1979

'15

Edwin P. Longstreet, Spring Lake, NJ,
June 4, 1979

'16

Vernon S. Jones, Mobile, AL,
November 16, 1978

'18

Roger R. Townsend, Redondo Beach, CA

'24

Judge Harold L. Paul, Seaford, DE,
June 16, 1979

'25

Edward Starr, Jr., Philadelphia, PA,
June 24,1979

'27

Nathan J. Schneider, Philadelphia, PA,
June 24, 1979

'28

Martin Greenblatt, Philadelphia, PA,
May 26,1979

'31

Charles Hunsicker, Jr., New Cumberland,
PA, July 16, 1979

'32

Frank A. Bruno, Lakewood, OH,
May 11, 1979

'40

Don C. Reiley, Bedford, PA,
May 24,1979
Paul Yermish, Narberth, PA,
July 21,1979

'57

Archimedes Cervera, Bayshore, NY,
June 17, 1979

'58

John J. Runzer, Fort Washington, PA,
July 2, 1979

'74

Kenneth L. Mines, Philadelphia, PA,
August 5, 1979
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